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The Confrontation Clause guarantees to the accused a 
process not a product.**
Abstract
Later in the course of the democratic reformation of the justice system, the Judiciary, 
supported by the civil rights groups and a majority of the legislators, tried to limit 
prosecutorial and police power. More precisely, they opposed the “dossier-building” practice in 
the pre-trial stage that the prosecutor dominates. Thus they decided to control it. The best way 
would be to deny protocols’ admissibility and to encourage the parties to offer more live 
testimonies. The rule against hearsay basically guarantees this paradigm shift. The 
amendment also opened the way for calling those who heard the suspects’ statements’. But 
trial judges prefer to read protocols in office in preparation for trials. The videotape is not even 
in the list of substantial evidence. 
Certainly, the protocols containing PIS have lost their authoritative voice. They must have 
been prepared properly, be reliable, genuine, correct, and made in a particularly reliable 
situation. Furthermore, the testifier must be available for cross-examination from a defense 
counsel. All these requirements make the prosecution increasingly more dependent on 
protocols made with suspect parties’ admissions. 
The most popular evidence still seems to be a protocol with party admission. Videotapes 
are prepared for supporting its admissibility not for substantial evidence. In the Korean 
criminal process, this sort of protocol itself flows as if it is something that reveals the truth. 
Roughly speaking, the Korean criminal process is similar to that of the French one of which 
Professor Langbein has given an interesting description.
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I. Introduction
Americans understand what the rule against hearsay is as do Koreans. 
The Korean Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter “CPC”) outlines the 
hearsay rule and its exceptions. Korean scholars and practitioners are 
familiar with the history and development of that typical Anglo-American 
evidentiary rule. In the criminal trial in Korea, judges and lawyers 
frequently discuss it.
However, it seems that people designate different objects even though 
employing the same terms. Koreans refer to the hearsay rule and the right 
of cross-examination but have no specific interest in the famous case, 
Crawford v. Washington.1) Korea still uses the dossier, which has been used 
in the typical Continental inquisitorial process, as substantial evidence even 
though the rule against hearsay is often announced as one of evidentiary 
rules.
This article provides focuses on reporting the development of the rule in 
Korea (II) and explaining why the rule against hearsay mattered in the 
Korean Judicial reform, which resulted in the amendment of the CPC in 
2007. A sketch of the two years’ practice after that reform follows (III) and 
concludes with commentary on the ongoing struggle between the Judiciary 
and the Prosecution for getting the initiative and discretionary power in the 
pre-trial fact-finding process (IV).
II. The General Feature of Korean Hearsay Rule
1. Code of Criminal Procedure 
The CPC was promulgated in 1954 and amended more than ten times 
including the extensive revision in 2007.2) Since Korea does not have any 
specific Code on Evidence, CPC also provides 15 articles about criminal 
1) Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2) See generally JaeSang lee, SinHyeongSaSoSongbeop [new CRiminal pRoCeduRe law 15-20] 
(2008). 
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evidentiary rules and exceptions under the title of Evidence.3) Worthy of 
note is that about half of those articles regard the rule against hearsay and 
its exceptions.4) More specifically, article 310-2 announces the hearsay rule 
by saying:
Except as provided for in Articles 311 through 316, any 
document which contains a statement in place of the statement 
made at a preparatory hearing or during public trial, or any 
statement the import of which is another person’s statement made 
outside preparatory hearing or at the time other than the public 
trial, shall not be admitted as evidence.5) 
Accordingly, articles 311 to 316 provide the foundational requirements 
for several exceptions written or spoken.6) Written hearsay statements may 
be admitted as evidence if they fall within the category provided by the 
articles from 311 to 315.7) On the other hand, spoken statements are 
admissible through article 316 which states:
Oral testimony given by a person other than the defendant at a 
preparatory hearing or during a public trial, the import of which is 
the statement of a person other than the defendant, shall be 
admitted into evidence only when the maker of the original 
statement is unable to testify because he is dead, ill, or resides 
abroad, his whereabouts is not known, or there is any other similar 
reason, and only if it is proved that the statement was made in a 
particularly reliable situation.8) 
3) See HyeongSaSoSongbeop [CRiminal pRoCeduRe Code (CPC)], art. 307-318(3).   
4) See CPC, art. 310(2)-316. 
5) CPC, art. 310(2) .
6) See CPC art. 311-16.  
7) See CPC art. 311-15.   
8) CPC, art. 316 .
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2. Practical Matters Regarding the Rule against Hearsay
In Korea, the hearsay rule is a well-known subject, and scholars and 
practitioners are sufficiently informed of Roberts, Crawford and even Davis 
v. Washington.9) The highly competitive bar exams are full of hearsay essay 
questions which applicants must answer and thus need to be familiar with 
the basic concepts of the FRE and some of its legislative history. Korea is 
one of the most loyal followers of the rule against hearsay which took form 
“between 1675 and 1690”10) in England. As a consequence, the Korean legal 
circle paid close attention to Crawford and not surprisingly, several articles 
ventured to analyze the aftershock caused by the ruling on legal practice in 
the United States.11) 
However, the Crawford conclusion regarding Confrontation could not be 
applied or cited in Korea because the Korean Constitution does not 
guarantee the right of Confrontation for the criminal defendant. It 
guarantees the right against self-incrimination12) and that of due process,13) 
but it does not include the meaning of Confrontation that Crawford 
rediscovered. Rather, the CPC permits law enforcement personnel to use 
confrontation as one of the possible ways for finding the truth as shown by 
article 245 which states that “[a] public prosecutor or judicial police officer 
may, if necessary to determine the facts, confront the suspect with other 
suspects or testifiers,”14) but it is not mandatory. 
9) Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). About the meaning of the Davis conclusion, 
see generally Thomas Y. Davies, Not the “Framer’s Design”: How the Framing Era Ban against 
Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of the Scope of the Original 
Confrontation Clause, 15 J.l. & pol’y 349 (2007). 
10) 5 wigmoRe, evidenCe § 1364, at 16 (3d ed. 1940) (“No precise date or ruling stands out 
as decisive; but it seems to be between 1675 and 1690 that the fixing of the [rule against 
hearsay] doctrine takes place”).
11) See generally Taesup Geum, The Tendency of the United States Supreme Court’s Cases after 
Crawford, in HyungSaSoSongeui yiRongwaSilmu [tHeoRy and pRaCtiCe of CRiminal tRialS], 1-15 
(2010). 
12) See daeHanminkuk Hunbeob [ConStitution] art. 12(2) (1987) translated at http://english.
ccourt.go.kr/home/english/welcome/republic.jsp (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
13) See ConStitution art. 12(1).
14) CPC, art. 245 .
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Another reason that the Korean legal circle is not deeply interested in 
the Crawford revolution is that the testimonial statements by out-of-court 
declarants are not considered such important evidence that the government 
officials need to make efforts to prepare them as one of the hearsay 
exceptions. If a police officer made an investigation report and cannot come 
to the court “because he is dead, ill, or resides abroad,”15) the article stating 
the hearsay exception of the police report comes to play. According to that 
article, the court may accept that report as substantial evidence if it finds 
that “the statement was or preparation [of that report] was made in a 
particularly reliable situation.”16) However, that report admitted as 
evidence would not be a critical weapon for the prosecution because its 
evidentiary weight would depend on, as a matter of practice, judicial 
discretion.17) Any reasonable judge will not condemn a defendant solely on 
the basis of the police report the producer of which has disappeared. 
Other hearsay exceptions are similarly treated in which hearsay declarants 
are absent from public trial. These sorts of exceptions merely strengthen 
the conviction that fact-finders have already reached through live 
testimonies and review of the protocols made by law enforcement 
personnel, which are basically regarded as relevant and convincing 
evidence in Korea. Live testimony is not at issue so discussion is 
unnecessary.
3. Protocols by Law Enforcement Personnel
A testifier might say, “I saw the suspect at the crime scene. Since I was 
just a few meters distant from there, I am sure that it was the suspect who 
killed the victim.” Hearing this information from a testifier, law 
enforcement personnel such as a police officer or a public prosecutor 
decides to indict the suspect and prepares documents called protocols. 
Sometimes, however, a witness “turn[s] coat”18) in the trial and denies what 
15) CPC, art. 314.
16) CPC, art. 314.  
17) See infra note 65.  
18) Jennifer L. Hiliard, Substantive Admissiblity of a Non-Party Witness’ Prior Inconsistenst 
Statements: Pennsylvania Adopts the Modern View, 32 vill. l. Rev. 471, n.5 (1987) (“A turncoat 
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he has told in the investigation stage or even the fact that he has told 
anything to the officer. Then the law enforcement personnel may have a 
very realistic option, which is to present the protocol as substantial 
evidence. The protocols can be also made with the suspects’ inculpating 
statements and are sometimes admissible as evidence even though the 
defendant later changes the statement.19) 
In these cases, the testifier’s statement is somewhat close to, by nature, 
the Prior Inconsistent Statement under the FRE 801(d)(1) and that of the 
suspects to the party admission under 801(d)(2). Both are excluded, in the 
Federal courts, from the hearsay definition20) and admissible as substantial 
evidence if they meet some foundational requirements.21) 
In Korea, the protocols containing the PIS and the party admission are 
defined as hearsay22) and their admissibility normally depends on whether 
they are qualified as an exception.23) Then why does the CPC consider the 
suspects’ and testifiers’ statements as hearsay and tries to check their 
admissibility in terms of hearsay exceptions? To understand this, a bit of 
historical research is needed.
1. Historical Narrative 
The French Code d’Instruction Criminnelle (hereinafter “CIC”) was a very 
important model in the development of the Japanse and Korean Criminal 
Procedures.24) From the ordinance of Villers-Cotterets in 1532 to the CIC, 
witness is a witness who has on some prior occasion told a different story than that to which 
he is testifying on the stand”).
19) See CPC art. 312.
20) See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d).
21) See id. (“A statement is not hearsay if (1) The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing 
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) 
inconsistent with the declarant‘s testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty 
of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition […and] (2) The statement 
is offered against a party and is (A) the party‘s own statement, in either an individual or a 
representative capacity”).  
22) See CPC art. 310-2.
23) See CPC art. 312.
24) See, e.g., wankyoo lee, HyeongSaSoSongbeop yeongoo [a Study on tHe CRiminal 
pRoCeduRe law] 182 (2008) (“Japan has introduced the modernized European system in the 
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the French criminal justice prepared a system in which a neutral judge or a 
surrogate examined the suspect and the testifier for making a type of 
evidence called a dossier or protocol.25) The Code gave that power to the 
juge d’instruction in 1808 which is still true and continues in the modernized 
Code de la Procedure Penale in France.26) 
In the nineteenth century, the Japanse government extensively copied 
the so-called French system of pre-trial investigation, information 
preparatoire, into their proper code27) because, at that time, it was regarded 
as the most advanced and civilized method of prosecution.28) Thus the 
Japanse version of the juge d’instruction was invented and endowed with 
the right to interrogate suspects and witnesses, and more importantly, to 
make dossiers admissible as evidence later in a public trial.29) 
When Japanese troops conquered the Korean penninsula, they came 
with their codes. Japanese codes became effective through the Ordinance of 
Chosun (hereinafter “Ordinance”), which ordered that the Japanese code 
should be equally applied in the Korean courts.30) Accordingly, Koreans 
were supposed to follow the French model of criminal prosecution. 
However, one of the most important differences between the Korean model 
and the Japanese/French one was that the juge d’instruction might delegate 
his work to a police officer or a prosecutor according to articles 12 to 13 of 
era of Meiji and promulgated the Criminal Instruction Law which was similar to the Code 
d’Instruction Criminelle in 1880”). 
25) See generally JoHn H. langbein, pRoSeCuting CRime in tHe RenaiSSanCe 223-39 (1974). 
Since the juge d’instruction produces a dossier, I will call the document made by a prosecutor 
or a police officer as a protocol. The Korean Legislation Research Institute officially translates 
“joseo” in Korean as “protocol” in English rather than “dossier.” See http://elaw.klri.re.kr/ 
(last visited Sep.tember 19, 2010). 
26) See C. PR. Pen. § 120.  
27) About the French CIC’s influence upon the Meiji Japan, see myungSeon noH & 
wankyoo lee, HyeongSaSoSongbeop [CRiminal pRoCeduRe law] 43, n.47 (2009). 
28) lee, supra note 2, at 13 (“This CIC has been called as the reformed Criminal Procedure 
Law because of its freshness. It was also regarded as a democratic law and deeply affected the 
European criminal procedure). 
29) See Keiji soshoho [Code of Criminal Procedure], Law No. 75 of 1922, art. 56. 
30) Ordinance Article 1(10) reprinted in SupReme pRoSeCution SeRviCe, mateRialS foR tHe 
legiSlation and amendment of tHe CRiminal pRoCeduRe law 42 (Supreme Prosecution Office, 
1997). 
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the Ordinance.31) 
Originally, the CIC was designed to protect the fundamental rights of 
the suspect, and that is why the investigative role was conferred to one of 
the magistrates who had received intensive legal training.32) The problem 
was that if a judge conducted the entire investigation, it would become 
inevitably slow and ineffective.33) Thus the idea that some investigative 
powers could be delegated to law enforcement personnel had been adopted 
in France and Japan. Such delegation was called the commission rogatoire in 
French.34) The Japanese colonial government further thought it would be 
more effective to use police and prosecutorial resources, specifically in 
Korea, than to require the Japanese juge d’instruction, who did not 
understand Korean, be responsible for the entire prosecution of Korean 
criminals. Consequently, policemen and prosecutors came to play the role 
of juge d’instruction in Korea. In other words, they could make protocols 
which were admissible as evidence in trials.35) 
In Japanese criminal procedure, the admissibility of the protocols 
was widely accepted, but the right to interrogate suspects and to 
produce them was mainly conferred to the judge. The commission 
rogatoire to the police officer and the prosecutor was limited, so it 
was fairly safe to admit the judges’ dossiers as evidence in a public 
trial. However, in colonized Korea, the problem was that the police 
officers and prosecutors played the role of juge d’instruction, and 
31) See lee, supra note 24, at 295-96. 
32) See, e.g., Honorable Gene D. Cohen, Comparing the Investigating Grand Jury with the 
French System of Criminal Investigations: A Judge’s Perspective and Commentary, 13 temp. int’l 
Comp. l.J. 87, 105 (1999) (“The model is structured upon the employment of a single judge 
who is neutral, impartial, and dedicated to the investigation of crime in order to promote the 
ends of justice”).
33) See id. at 89 (“High on the list of complaints are the slowness and complexity of the 
process”).
34) See, e.g., C. PR. Pen. art. 81 (“Si le juge d’instruction est dans l’impossibilité de procéder 
lui-même à tous les actes d’instruction, il peut donner commission rogatoire aux officiers de 
police judiciaire afin de leur faire exécuter tous les actes d’information nécessaires dans les 
conditions et sous les réserves prévues aux articles 151 et 152.”). 
35) Ordinance Article 12 reprinted in SupReme pRoSeCution SeRviCe, supra note 30, at 43-4. 
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their protocols were equally admissible.36) 
After being remancipated from Japanese occupation, Koreans were 
unable to introduce modernized criminal procedures with their very 
limited personal and material resources. Japanese law had been effective in 
Korea for about nine years. Meanwhile, legal intelligence was devoted to 
making Korean criminal procedure law.37) In terms of official protocols, the 
conclusion was two-fold: Korean prosecutors might continue to make 
protocols as the juge d’instruction of France did, and police officers’ 
protocols would lose evidentiary weight because much abuse of power had 
already been experienced during the Japanese occupation. 
Judicial torture is an open secret in Korea. What we have to do 
for completely rooting it out is this: to negate the admissibility of the 
protocols made by the police officers and prosectuors. We may allow 
them to search evidence in the criminal investigation process. 
Nonetheless, the judicial torture will not stop unless we prohibit 
them from offering the protocols as evidence. The trial court should 
accept the protocol of the law enforcement personnel on the 
condition that the defendant or the defense counsel does not oppose 
to its admissibility. Otherwise, the protocol may not be regarded as 
evidence against the defendant, which is the best policy that we have 
to employ. However, some argued that, even though it was the best 
way for protecting the right of the defendant, it would possibly 
delay the trial, which would be another problem. Thus it has been 
agreed that we should admit the prosecutor’s protocol as evidence 
but should not accept the police officer’s protocol if the defendant 
opposed to its admissibility. Now, what the suspect tells the police 
officer or his confession in the police station will be a sort of script 
written on the blackboard so the defendant may easily erase it by 
denying “the contents of the protocols in a preparatory hearing or a 
36) lee, supra note 24, at 185-86. 
37) About the legislative history of the Korean criminal procedure law, see generally Dong-
Woon Shin, An Establishment Process of Korean Criminal Procedure Act of 1954, HyungSabeop 
yeongu [a Study on tHe CRiminal law], vol. 22, 2004.
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trial.” By doing that, we are able to reduce the judicial torture done 
in the police station, even if we may not totally terminate it.38)
The newly promulgated criminal procedure code in 1954 adhered to the 
above discourse and thus, the conclusion was that the prosecutor’s protocol 
was normally admissible and that of the police officer was not if it 
contained the suspect’s statement. Article 312 stated:
A protocol which contains a statement of a suspect or other 
people prepared by a public prosecutor or a police officer [...] may be 
introduced into evidence, if the genuineness thereof is established by 
the defendant or other people making the original statement at a 
preparatory hearing or during a public trial. However, a protocol 
prepared by any investigative institution other than a public 
prosecutor for examination of a suspect is admissible as evidence, 
only if the defendant, who was the suspect at the time of making 
statement, or his defense counsel admits its contents in a 
preparatory hearing or a public trial.39)
No reference to the rule against hearsay exists in this article indicating a 
lack of concern about the rule. In this first version of CPC, the word 
“hearsay” itself did not exist. The above article rather gave the prosecutor 
the right to make protocols and use them as substantial evidence, which 
was the prerogative of the juge d’instruction.40) The sole foundational 
qualification for protocols was that their “genuineness [be] established by 
the defendant or other people making the original statement at a 
preparatory hearing or during a public trial.”41) Genuineness meant that the 
protocol was the same one that the suspect had seen in the course of 
interrogation conducted by the prosecutor according to article 244 which 
stated: 
38) SupReme pRoSeCution SeRviCe, supra note 30, at 404. 
39) CPC, art. 312.
40) See supra note 34. 
41) CPC, art. 312 (1954). 
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(1) The statement of a suspect shall be entered in the protocol.
(2) The protocol of the above paragraph shall be made available 
to the suspect for inspection or shall be read to him. 
(3) If the suspect states that there is not any miss-writing in the 
protocol, the suspect shall be required to affix his seal between 
pages of the protocol, and print his name and affix his seal or 
write his signature thereon.42)
Korean investigators conduct a process called “suspect interrogation.”43) 
Both under the first CPC and now, interrogation results must be recorded 
in a document called “suspect interrogation protocol” and was 
automatically admissible under article 312 in the first CPC because the 
suspect himself has signed it after verifying the contents. Consequently, 
article 312 was established to check the authenticity of the protocol. 
Furthermore, the article not only stated the admissibility of a protocol 
but that of “a thing”44) procured by law enforcement personnel, so 
“genuineness” did not have anything to do with the hearsay rule which 
governed statement evidence. 
Compared to the suspect’s statement, the testifier’s statement was not 
prescribed to be recorded in protocols,45) but police officers and prosecutors 
normally made protocols with their statements. In that situation, the same 
article applies, and the genuineness of the protocol should be established 
by the testifier. Article 312 was supposed to apply to various situations in 
which pre-trial investigators conducted interrogations.
In contrast, if police officers made protocols with suspects’ statements, 
the protocols could not be used to prove guilt if they contested its 
admissibility which was provided in the second phrase of article 312.
42) CPC, art. 244 (1954). 
43) It is still true in Korea. See CPC, art. 242 (2009).
44) CPC, art 312 (1954). 
45) See, e.g., CPC, art 245 (1954). However, a police officer must prepare a testifier 
interrogation protocol according to Article 18(2) of Judicial Police Officers Performance Rules, 
legislated on December 31, 1959.  
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2. Introduction of the Hearsay Rule
Later in 1960, the first and a very important democratic revolution 
swept the Korean peninsula resulting in the introduction of adversarial 
criminal procedure into the CPC.46) Thus, an amendment has inserted 
article 310-2, entitled “the rule against hearsay,”47) just before the provisions 
regulating various protocols’ admissibility. Accordingly, article 310-2 made 
the same protocols as the hearsay exceptions. The new version of article 312 
regulating one of the protocols states: 
A protocol which contains a statement of a suspect … prepared 
by a public prosecutor … may be introduced into evidence, if the 
genuineness thereof is established by the person making the original 
statement at a preparatory hearing or during a public trial: Provided 
that a protocol containing the statement of the defendant who has 
been a suspect may be introduced into evidence only where the 
statement was made in a particularly reliable situation.48)
Close reading of the second part of the article brings to light its 
similarity to the foundational requirement applied to typical hearsay 
exceptions in the FRE.49) Of course, the article does not require that the 
suspect’s statement itself be reliable but the situation in which he states 
anything to the prosecutor be so. Nonetheless, in Korea, this requirement is 
considered closely related to “reliability” as one criterion applying to 
typical hearsay exceptions.50)
46) lee, supra note 2, at 16. 
47) CPC, art. 310-2 (1961).
48) CPC, art. 312 (1961). 
49) See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 807 (“A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 
but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the 
hearsay rule”) (emphasis added); wankyoo lee, supra note 24, at 194 (“In the amendment of 
1971, the provisions regarding Evidence have been modified according to the viewpoint of the 
rule against hearsay”). 
50) lee, supra note 2, at 565 (“Article 312 is regulating one of hearsay exceptions on the 
basis of reliability and necessity). 
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In reality, the article was established, under the influence of the 
American and Japanese scholarship on Evidence law, to limit the 
prosecutor’s right to make evidence.51) The problem, however, was that the 
wording was unclear or ambiguous, especially, the expression 
“genuineness.”52) As stated before, genuineness was interpreted as 
“authenticity” in the original version of the CPC.53) As a practical matter, a 
defendant might not be able to deny the authenticity of the protocol 
because he had already seen it and signed it. Therefore, the genuineness 
requirement would not be an obstacle for the prosecution to overcome. In 
contrast, if someone interpreted genuineness differently, it might be similar 
to the word “exactness” or “correctness” in Korean,54) and the consequence 
would be different. Since Article 312 was established after the 
announcement of the hearsay rule, “genuiness” probably should be 
interpreted as “correctness.”55) In other words, the issue would be whether 
the out-of-court statement of a suspect was “correctly recorded in the 
protocol.”56) Actually, it was agreed that article 312 was an instrument with 
two means of assessing the admissibility of a prosecutor’s protocol: one 
from determining its correctness, the other from questioning the reliability 
of the situation in which it had been produced.57) 
The same comment could be made for the protocols made by police 
officers and prosecutors with testifiers’ statements. Their genuineness 
should be established by the saying of the testifier who was on the witness 
stand in a later trial. In that situation, genuineness was more likely to be 
51) Japan has introduced the rule against hearsay from the States and Korea copied the 
Japanese hearay rule into its CPC in 1961. See lee, supra note 24, at 194-95. 
52) About the meaning of “genuineness” see generally id. at 191-94. 
53) See id. at 298 n.28 (“Interpreting genuineness as authenticiy was the general tendency 
and practice in the Fifties”).  
54) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 84do748, Jun. 26, 1984 (S. Korea) (“Genuine also means that 
the suspect’s statement was correctly recorded in the protocol”).
55) This attitude was called as “actual genuiness theory” in Korea. See, e.g., lee, supra note 
24, at 299.  
56) See supra note 54.
57) See, e.g., Bohak Seo, Constitutionality of Article 312(1) of CPC and Problems in the Public 
Trial, 22 HyungSabeop yeongu [a Study on tHe CRiminal law] 300 (2004) (“Reliability is the 
additional requirement for the protocol to be admitted as evidence”).
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“actual genuineness”58) or “correctness” because the testifier did not always 
have a chance to check the protocol’s contents.59) If the testifier said in a 
public trial, “OK. It is genuine,” it might mean that it correctly reported his 
saying in the pre-trial stage. Moreover, if the legislator put “genuineness” 
as one of the foundations for a hearsay exception, the best explanation must 
be that “genuineness” in the article was supposed to mean “correctness” 
rather than “genuine.”
3. Before 2004
The Korean court set forth two different scrutinies. In party admission 
cases, for over 40 years since 1961, the Korean courts did not try to 
disparage prosecutors’ protocols.60) Therefore, they concluded that if the 
suspect’s signature was genuine, the protocol’s actual genuineness or 
correctness was legally inferred and it could be used as evidence.61) 
On the other hand, they applied stricter criteria to the genuineness of 
the protocol containing the witnesses’ statements and stated:62) 
The mentioned protocol is not admissible because the witness 
denies the actual genuineness of the protocol by saying that the 
protocol does not correctly report what he has stated.63)  
In other words, the court checked only the authenticity of the procotocol 
made with the defendant’s statement while requiring more than that for the 
protocol with the testifier’s statement. The result was that increasing 
numbers of prosecutors wrote down suspects’ statements or even 
58) See supra note 55. 
59) See, e.g, CPC, art. 245 (1961).
60) See, e.g., Kuk Cho, The Admissibility of the Prosecutor’s Protocol and the Video-Taped 
Product, 107 JeoStiS 172 (2008) (“The prosecutor’s protocol has had a great power in the Korean 
criminal procedure for a long time”). 
61) See S. Ct., 84Do748, June 26, 1984 (S. Kor.); S. Ct., 98Do980, Feb. 28, 1997 (S. Kor.); S. 
Ct., 99Do128, June 27, 2000 (S. Kor.); S. Ct., 2001Do1049, June 29, 2001 (S. Kor.). 
62) See, e.g., lee, supra note 24, at 300. (“A stricter scrutiny has been applied to the 
prosecutor’s protocol with testifier’s statements from the early Eighties”).   
63) S. Ct., 95Do1761, Oct. 13, 1995 (S. Kor.). 
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concentrated on plausibly elaborating the procotocols to support their 
suspicions against the suspects.64) 
Those 40 years generally match the era in which get-tough policies 
gained popularity. During this time period, the rate of aquittal in public 
trials was less than 1%, and it was said that trial courts mainly followed the 
prosecutor’s conviction.65) 
Since then, the democratic party has regained power and ignited the 
so-called Judicial reform.66) Under the presidencies of Daejung Kim and 
Mu-hyun Noh, many committees have convened, and the legal circle 
expected real changes in criminal justice. Finally the SCK, composed of 
more democratic justices, cast real doubt about the admissibility of 
prosecutors’ protocols.
We should say that a protocol which contains a statement of a 
suspect […] by a public prosecutor may be introduced into evidence, 
if it satisfies that the signature marked on it is genuine and that it 
correctly copies what was said to the prosecutor. Likely interpreting 
would be appropriate to the fact-finding principle through public 
trial with direct hearings and oral arguments. Thus we are obliged to 
change our opinions which stated that the genuineness of the 
protocol was assumed as a matter of law from the fact that the 
signature was genuine.67)  
Presently, the court requires that a protocol’s genuineness should be 
determined from an in-court announcement by the defendant. If the 
defendant says that the prosecutor has not correctly copied his words into 
the protocol, the prosecutor cannot make it admissible unless he shows the 
64) See, e.g. Seo, supra note 57, at 303 (“Prosecutors try to get the confession from the 
suspect”). 
65) See, e.g., Cho, supra note 60, at 173-74. To make it worse, the courts rarely tried to 
exclude the prosecutor’s protocol on the basis of the so-called “reliability test” as set forth in 
the final sentence of article 312(1). See also Seo, supra note 57, at 297. 
66) About the history of the Korean Judicial Reform see generally http://eng.scourt.go.kr/
eng/judiciary/judicial_reform.jsp (last visited on Sept. 8, 2010).  
67) S. Ct., 2002Do537, Dec. 16, 2004 (S. Kor.). 
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correctness with “objective proof.”68) The new requirement was amazing 
because it was the first time that the court decided to employ any sort of 
strict scrutiny regarding the admissibility of protocols reporting suspects’ 
admissions. From that moment, tension between judges and prosecutors 
was perceived by the media, the legal circle, commentators, and citizens.69) 
The quarrel between the Judiciary and the Department of Justice has drawn 
widespread attention; nearly all newspapers and TV hearings reported the 
conflict between the two powers. To support the reformative action ignited 
by the decision, “[t]he presidential Committee on Judicial Reform was 
formed […] and focus[ed] on accomplishing an even more democratic, fair, 
and efficient judiciary with more openness and transparency.”70)
III. Korean Judicial Reform from 2004
1. Development
As stated previously, protocols have been understood, at least from the 
second amendment of the CPC, as an exception to the hearsay rule. Before 
2004, few scholars discussed the subject which was nonetheless very 
difficult to understand. After 2004, nearly everyone needed to know 
something about the rule against hearsay in order to participate in floor 
discussions at seminars and forums. The author was then a rookie having 
just completed a dissertation on Crawford in March 2005, and many people 
asked him to explain what happened in the United States after Crawford. 
Many American professors and practitioners were also invited to small and 
large meetings both in the Supreme Court and the Supreme Prosecution 
Service. Korean judges who have spent some sabbatical years in American 
law schools as visiting scholars came to be a Robespierre or Danton, revenant 
68) Yeongki Hong, Methods of Establishing the Actual Genuineness of the Prosecutor’s Protocol 
with the Suspect’s Statements, 21 HyungSabeop yeongu [a Study on tHe CRiminal law] 234 
(2009).
69) About the aftermath of the decision see SunSoo kim, RepoRt on tHe JudiCial RefoRm 245-
47 (2008). 
70) http://eng.scourt.go.kr/eng/judiciary/judicial_reform.jsp (last visited on Sept. 8, 
2010).
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des Etats-Unis, in this revolutionary era. The judges basically emphasized 
the rule against hearsay; whereas, the prosecutors preferred talking about 
its exceptions because they needed to proffer protocols as evidence. In 
order to support either side of the arguments, many research resources 
have been poured into the Common Law rule against hearsay71) and the 
trial of Sir Walter Raleigh.72)
Not only in university discussions but in daily criminal procedures, the 
rule against hearsay and its exceptions was extensively mentioned. One of 
the most important issues from 2004 to 2007, during which the amendment 
to the CPC was proposed after being elaborated by the Presidential 
Committee on Judicial reform and passed into law in the Assembly, was 
whether to justify the protocol’s hearsay exception.73) Initially, the judiciary 
gathered opinions from the trial benches across the peninsula and urged 
the prosecution service not to try to make protocols hoping that the courts 
would accept them as substantial evidence.74) Responding to this blow, the 
prosecutors answered: ‘OK. No more protocols. But we will videotape all 
the investigatory process from the suspect’s entering into the room to his 
departure. Accept them as evidence.’75) On this proposition, the judiciary 
was confused. They could not agree to the admissibility of the protocol but, 
at the same time, it was out-of-the question to play the videotapes 
containing the suspect’s inculpating statement in court.76) For if it were 
allowed, the court would be the place for watching the suspect’s confession 
through screen.77) Finally the trial judges changed attitudes towards 
protocols and dissuaded their representatives from trying to completely 
71) See generally dongun CHa, CRiminal evidenCe law i (2007).  
72) About the discussion of the Raleigh case see Heekyoon Kim, Crawford Case: Rediscovery 
of the Confrontation Right of the Criminal Defendant, 586 bupJo [tHe JudiCiaRy JouRnal] 149-50 
(2005). 
73) See, e.g., kim, supra note 70, at 246. 
74) About the “Judiciary’s Evidence Law draft(Oh Kidoo draft)” see lee, supra note 25, at 
217. 
75) About the prosecution’s effort to introduce a videotape as evidence see Cho, supra note 
60, at 176; Jongryul Kim, A Study on Video Recording and a Development of Prosecution’s 
Investigation, 8 HyungSabupeui SindongHyang [new paRadigm of CRiminal Study] 81 (2007). 
76) See Cho, supra note 61, at 176.  
77) See Kidu Oh, Application of the Revised Criminal Procedure Law, 103 JuStiCe 95 (2008). 
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eliminate them from criminal trials.78) The representatives did not even 
imagine that trial judges were in favor of using protocols as trial evidence. 
But the truth was that judges were also very accustomed to the trials using 
written information prepared by their colleagues, i.e., the prosecutors.79)  
The first draft of the Committee has provoked the opposition 
from the prosecution and moreover, trial judges accustomed to the 
trials using protocols pointed that it would result in increasing 
workload.80) 
2. Compromise 
1) Protocols with the Suspect’s Statements
A compromise was reached after extensive debate. The conclusion was 
this: 1. Prosecutors produce protocols as they did 2. Protocols are not 
admissible unless defendants confirm their genuineness by stating that the 
prosecutor correctly copied the statements; 3. If the defendant denies the 
genuineness, prosecutors need to prove it through scientific methods, for 
example by showing the videotape captured at investigation.81) 
Nonetheless, prosecutors cannot proffer videotapes as substantial 
evidence because they are not legally admissible.82) If prosecutors want to 
report the suspects’ statements in court, they may, first of all, use the 
protocol83) which should have been “prepared in compliance with due 
process and proper method”84) and that “the defendant [admits] in his 
pleading in a preparatory hearing or a public trial that its contents [be] the 
78) See kim, supra note 69, at 266 (“The Supreme Court changed their positions and 
proposed the idea that the prosecutor’s protocol may be admitted as evidence if it satisfied 
some requirements”); lee, supra note 24, at 222. 
79) See id at 266-67; See also Cho, supra note 60, at 178. 
80) dongwoon SHin, new CRiminal pRoCeduRe law 919 (2008). 
81) See kim, supra note 69, at 276-77.
82) See, e.g., Cho, supra note 60, at 184-85 (“The advisory note to the amendment of 2007 
clarified that “a videotape should not be used as substantial evidence”). 
83) It is not the prosecution’s duty to proffer the protocol. In that case, the trial court 
should find the truth on the basis of the in-court statement by the defendant not of the 
videotape. See id. at 187.  
84) CPC, art. 312(1).
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same as he stated.”85) In addition, the court needs to agree that “the 
statement recorded in the protocol was made in a particularly reliable 
situation.”86) All these should be satisfied for the protocol to be admissible. 
The general purpose of the article was to block the flow of the evidence 
that the prosecutor transmits. The reformative force seemed to hurt the 
prosecutor’s power. Nonetheless, the prosecution has preserved one more 
option to report suspects’ statements in court: 87) to summon the police 
officer or prosecutor who has heard the suspect’s admission in the 
investigation room. The revised article 316 states:
If a statement made by a person other than a defendant 
(including a person who interrogated the defendant as a suspect 
before the institution of public prosecution or who was involved in 
such interrogation; hereafter the same shall apply in this Article) in 
a preparatory hearing or a trial conveys a statement of the 
defendant, such statement is admissible as evidence only if it is 
proved that the statement was made in a particularly reliable 
situation.88)
However, this article’s influence would be limited in two regards. The 
prosecution would bear the risk of having its investigating prosecutor or 
police officer prosecuted.89) Furthermore, the investigator’s statement that 
the suspect has confessed in front of him may not be used as supporting 
evidence for the correctness of the protocol. In other words, the statement 
itself would not be categorized as one of the “scientific methods”90) for 
proving the actual genuineness of the protocol. As recently stated by the 
trial court in Pusan: 
85) CPC, art. 312(1).
86) CPC, art. 312(1).
87) See kim, supra note 69, at 277.
88) CPC, art. 316(1).
89) See, e.g., kim, supra note 69, at 253 (“Investigating prosecutors were against article 316 
because they would be summoned to the court as a simple witness”); Cho, supra note 60, at 
177.
90) CPC, art. 312(2).
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The statement of the person who interrogated the suspect may 
not be regarded as “scientific methods.91) 
The court will not call the investigators who heard the parties’ 
admissions for determining the protocols’ admissibility, but will call them 
in cases in which a protocol is not prepared or offered as evidence. Then 
article 316(1) comes into play. However, it is not a good option for the 
prosecution because, as just stated, the investigator will be a simple witness 
equally vulnerable to a counter-attack from the defense. Prosecutorial 
practice will therefore be increasingly dependant on making and presenting 
protocols as evidence with videotapes supporting their genuineness, which 
leads to the conclusion that protocols are still the center of the fact-finding 
process in public trials which is evident in observing legal practice since the 
amendment.92) 
Trial judges ask the defendant about the genuineness of the protocol. Or 
they verify its genuineness by watching the videotape. If the defendant 
confirms its authenticity, judges conduct the so-called reliability test. 
However, in most cases the protocol will be held as admissible.93) If the 
defendant says it’s not genuine and there is no videotape, the judges will 
drop the protocol. The prosecution may not call those who interrogated the 
suspects, because their testimony does not have any evidentiary power in 
situations in which the defendant has already denied the protocol’s 
genuineness.
On the other hand, if the prosecution did not make a protocol or 
decided not to proffer any protocol,94) the situation would be a bit different. 
Certainly, they may call the person who interrogated the suspect. In that 
case, his statement should be compared to the live testimony of the 
defendant. In other words, the prosecution may not guarantee the victory. 
91) Pusan High Court, 2008no131, Apr. 15, 2008 (S. Kor.).
92) Wankyoo Lee, The Trial Practice after the Amendment and Some Proposals, 15 
HyungSabeopeui SindongHyang [new paRadigm of CRiminal Study] 133 (2008) (“The reality is 
that [prosecutors] offer the protcols as evidence and judges read them in their office for 
finding the truth”).
93) See supra note 65. 
94) A prosecutor must record the result of the interrogation with a suspect but it is not his 
duty to proffer it as evidence to the trial court. See, e.g., Cho, supra note 60, at 187.
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The possibility exists that one of the investigating prosecutors may bear the 
risk of being prosecuted for perjury. That is why the protocol still plays the 
most important role in practice as it did in the past.95)
Trial judges are also not opposed to conducting criminal trials using 
protocols. They do not have much time to allow many participants to come 
and relate conflicting versions,96) and they need to get a succinct report of 
what happened in the pre-trial stage.97) These concerns make them 
especially dependant upon protocols which is of primary importance in 
Korea.98) Some reformers have tried to eliminate them, but the truth is that 
they “have survived”99) as one commentator has quipped.
 
2) Protocols with the Testifier’s Statements
In contrast to protocols concerning defendants, reformers have 
succeeded in controlling the other type of protocol which contains the PIS 
by the testifier. A relatively strict foundational barrier had been established 
during the Eighties.100) In addition, the final article provided a multi-prong 
test by stating: 
A protocol in which a public prosecutor or a judicial police 
officer recorded a statement of any person other than the defendant 
is admissible as evidence, only if it was prepared in compliance 
with the due process and proper method, it is proved by a 
statement made by the original stater on a preparatory hearing or a 
trial, a video-recorded product or any other scientific methods that 
the contents of the protocol are the same as what he stated before 
the public prosecutor or judicial police officer, and the defendant or 
his defense counsel has an opportunity to examine the original 
stater in relation to its contents in a preparatory hearing or a trial: 
Provided, That it is admissible only when it is proved that the 
95) See id. at 189. 
96) See, e.g., Lee, supra note 92, at 132-33; Cho, supra note 60, at 187.
97) See Lee, supra note 92, at 139-40.
98) See, e.g., Hong, supra note 68, at 244. 
99) Cho, supra note 60, at 178. 
100) See supra note 62. 
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statement recorded in the protocol was made in a particularly 
reliable situation.101)
Even if the protocol may be regarded as correct and reliable, it is not 
automatically admissible as evidence because the defendant’s counsel must 
have a chance of cross-examining “the original stater in relation to its 
contents in a preparatory hearing or a trial.”102) The reformers’ purpose 
was very clear, which was to copy the FRE 801(d)(1) which requires that 
turn-coat witnesses be cross-examinationed: 
 
The amendment has clarified on the theoretical basis of 
[Crawford] that giving an opportunity of cross-examination was one 
of the foundational requirements for the protocol containing a 
testifier’s statement to be admitted as evidence.103)
Certainly, the amendment’s situation is different from the Crawford case 
because the concern here is the out-of-court hearsay declarant. Nonetheless, 
the reformers’ objective to control protocols’ admissibility through the 
reliability test and the cross-examination requirement seems to be 
successful. Legal practice proceeds as follows.
To start, trial judges ask the witnesses, i.e. the original testifiers, whether 
the protocols correctly report their statements. If they deny them, the 
prosecution must prove the correctness by “a video-recorded product or 
any other scientific methods.”104) Even if the testifiers reply in the positive, 
the judges permit the defendants’ counsel to cross-examine the witness 
concerning the contents of the protocol. Upon completion of these steps, the 
judges have discretionary power on the admissibility of the protocol, which 
is regulated in the final sentence of Article 312(4). Likely, it became too 
difficult for the prosecution to offer the witness’s PIS as evidence. 
If the testifier denies the genuineness of the protocol, the situation 
101) CPC, art. 312(4).
102) CPC, art. 312(4).
103) national CouRt adminiStRation, noteS on tHe ReviSed CRiminal pRoCeduRe Code 137 
(2007). 
104) CPC, art. 312(4).
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becomes even tougher for the prosecution. Proffering the videotape as 
evidence is prohibited,105) and, even more challenging, the prosecution may 
not introduce the live testimony of the police officer who has heard the 
witness’ statement. For example, the SCK has supported the conclusion 
reached by the appellate court:106) 
If [the original testifier] says that she does not remember what 
she has talked [sic] to the police officer, the protocol made by that 
officer is not admissible as evidence because it is denied that “the 
contents[…] are the same as what [she] stated before the police 
officer.” In the same context, the live testimony of a police officer 
who has heard the witness’ statement is not either admissible.107)
If the prosecution has not made a protocol with the testifier’s 
statements,108) the testifier may be called as a witness creating a court-
centered trial with live testimonies. In such a trial, defendants may invoke 
their rights to cross-examine or confront the witnesses, and the rule against 
hearsay truly comes to govern a public trial. In other words, the protocols 
draw back and live testimonies cause resonance in the trial.
3. Comment 
 
This article has discussed four different types of protocols. Of these, a 
protocol made by the police officer with the suspect’s statement is not 
admissible if the defendant, who was then the suspect, does not agree to its 
admissibility.109) The following table shows different laws regulating the 
admissibility of the other three protocols.
105) See Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.] 2008no606, July 11, 2008 (S. Kor.). 
106) See S. Ct. 2008do6985, Sept. 25, 2008 (S. Kor.).  
107) See supra note 105.
108) The prosecution is not required to record the interrogation result with a testifier in 
the protocol. 
109) See CPC, art. 312(3) (“A protocol prepared by any investigative institution other than 
a public prosecutor for examination of a suspect is admissible as evidence, only if […] his 
defense counsel admits its contents in a preparatory hearing or a trial”).
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As is shown in the table, Korean legislators have been trying to limit 
protocols’ admissibility with the result that some protocols have survived 
and some have not. 
While trying to find the historical narrative of the rule against hearsay, 
the Crawford court roughly summarized two different legal traditions: the 
common-law tradition and the Continental one. It is said that “[t]he 
common-law tradition is one of live testimony in court subject to 
adversarial testing, while the civil law condones examination in private by 
judicial officers.”110) The court also accused “the civil-law practice [in which] 
justices of the peace or other officials examined suspects and witnesses 
before trial … [and] certif[ied] the results to the court.”111) According to the 
Crawford court, the Korean model of the pre-trial investigation was very 
close to the civil-law one. It is inquisitorial because it has copied the “[c]
ontinental Inquisitions-prozess […] in which the magistrate investigated, 
principally by interrogation of the accused; reduced the results of his 
investigation, including the testimony of the accused, to writing; and 
transmitted this dossier to the final sentencing court for a judgment which 
was based upon and effectively controlled by the dossier.”112) The sole 
110) 3 W. blaCkStone, CommentaRieS of tHe lawS of england 373-374 (1768), reprinted in 
Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359.
111) Id. at 1359-60. 
112) langbein, supra note 25, at 21.
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difference was, in Korea, that the prosecutor and the police officers had the 
authoritative initiative in finding evidence before trial in lieu of the juge 
d’instruction, i.e., investigating magistrate proprement dit. 
Later in the course of the democratic reformation of the justice system, 
the Judiciary, supported by the civil rights groups and a majority of the 
legislators, tried to limit prosecutorial and police power.113) More precisely, 
they opposed the “dossier-building”114) practice in the pre-trial stage that 
the prosecutor dominates.115) Thus they decided to control it. The best way 
would be to deny protocols’ admissibility and to encourage the parties to 
offer more live testimonies.116) The rule against hearsay basically guarantees 
this paradigm shift. The amendment also opened the way for calling those 
who heard the suspects’ statements’.117) But trial judges prefer to read 
protocols in office in preparation for trials.118) The videotape is not even in 
the list of substantial evidence.119) 
Certainly, the protocols containing PIS have lost their authoritative 
voice. They must have been prepared properly, be reliable, genuine, 
correct, and made in a particularly reliable situation. Furthermore, the 
testifier must be available for cross-examination from a defense counsel. All 
these requirements make the prosecution increasingly more dependent on 
protocols made with suspect parties’ admissions. 
The most popular evidence still seems to be a protocol with party 
admission.120) Videotapes are prepared for supporting its admissibility not 
for substantial evidence. In the Korean criminal process, this sort of 
protocol itself flows as if it is something that reveals the truth. Roughly 
speaking, the Korean criminal process is similar to that of the French one of 
which Professor Langbein has given an interesting description. 
113) See Cho, supra note 60, at 189.
114) langbein, supra note 25, at 23. 
115) See Cho, supra note 60, at 189.
116) See Hong, supra note 68, at 228.
117) See CPC, art. 316(1). 
118) See Lee, supra note 92, at 133. 
119) See, e.g., national CouRt adminiStRation, supra note 103, at 51; Hong, supra note 68, at 
236.   
120) See supra note 60. 
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The dossier commenced with the examiner’s preliminary 
inquiry, picked up the repeated submissions of the procureur […]
then became the record of the judge’s examinations and his 
deliberations with his advisory council […] The dossier was the 
thread of physical continuity in a procedure ever more complex, 
with its multiple stages conducted over stretches of time by a variety 
of officials.121) 
IV. Conclusion
Allegedly, one of the important agendas of the Korean Judicial reform 
was to realize “the principle of court-centeredness”122) and to strengthen the 
rule against hearsay by limiting admissible exceptions. However, the rule 
in Korea is not that of Walter Raleigh or Crawford because what nearly 
always mattered in Korea was not out-of-court statements by absent 
witnesses but the out-of-court admission, confession, or testimonies of the 
defendant or the testifiers who should be present in the court. In other 
words, the rule against hearsay was mainly used in evaluating the ex parte 
protocols in which the suspect or the testifiers stated the inculpating facts. 
The right of confrontation against the absent hearsay declarant has never 
been an issue in Korea. The aftershock of Crawford was extremely faint. 
Certainly, the development of the American hearsay rule, including 
Crawford, is being copied in a certain article which, for example, regulates 
the PIS of the present witness.123) However, cross-examination is not 
employed to guarantee the defendant’s basic right to fair trial but to 
support the admissibility of the ex parte protocol.
What the Korean legal system must confess is that the French style 
dossiers are still used even though the rule against hearsay is frequently 
announced. The prosecution’s protocol with the suspects’ statement is 
primarily guiding all criminal process, and therefore, the protocols’ 
121) langbein, supra note 25, at 251. 
122) kim, supra note 69, at 247.
123) See supra note 103.  
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producer dominates the pre-trial and in-trial fact-finding projects.124) 
Legislators have tried to devaluate it using the rule against hearsay. But in 
practice, this effort has failed because the protocol itself is deeply rooted in 
our everyday criminal process; it is familiar and seems more efficient and 
productive and less time-consuming than in-court live testimony or 
videotape.125) The French invented the protocol, the Japanese introduced it 
to Korea, and the Korean legal system has played with it too much making 
it difficult to discard in the near future.
key woRdS: rule against hearsay, dossier, protocol, Crawford, adversarial
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124) See supra note 60. 
125) See, e.g., Lee, supra note 92, at 129.

***
***
